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ABSTRACT 
 
Considering that stock price crashes are positively associated with opaque financial reporting and 
that effective internal control over financial reporting is essential for reliable and transparent 
financial reporting, it is thus vital to establish and maintain effective internal control over 
financial reporting. In this paper, we investigate the impact of internal control weakness on stock 
price crash risk, using the disclosures under Section 404 of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We find 
that material weakness in internal control over financial reporting increases information 
asymmetry by producing unreliable and/or opaque financial reporting, subsequently resulting in a 
stock price crash. Our study provides evidence that ineffective internal control over financial 
reporting is an indicator of future stock price crashes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study investigates the impact of internal control weakness on stock price crash risk, using the 
disclosures under Section 404(b) of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act.  
 
Hutton et al. (2009) argue that hoarding bad news for long periods can lead to stock price crashes if the 
accumulated bad news is revealed all at once. They find a positive association between opaque financial reporting 
and stock price crash risk, suggesting that firms with lower financial transparency intentionally conceal bad news for 
a long time, increasing information asymmetry and eventually resulting in stock price crashes. Kim et al. (2011) find 
that tax avoidance leads to stock price crashes. We expand the literature (e.g., Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011 
2015) by examining if internal control weakness is another indicator of incoming stock price crashes. 
 
It is well known that effective internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) is critical for producing 
reliable financial information.1 Effective ICFR enhances the reliability and accuracy of accounting information, thus 
reducing information risk. Firms with weak internal control are therefore more likely to withhold bad news and 
provide investors with less reliable financial information, which can increase information asymmetry.  
 
We thus posit that ICFR effectiveness is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. Using sample 
firms that disclosed their ICFR effectiveness pursuant to SOX Section 404(b) from 2004 to 2012, we test how 
material weakness is associated with the occurrence of stock price crashes.2, 3 We find that firms with ineffective 
                                                
1AS No. 5 describes the importance of effective internal control over financial reporting as follows: “Effective internal control over financial 
reporting provides reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes. If one or more material weaknesses exist, the company's internal control over financial reporting cannot be considered effective.”  
2 SOX Section 404(a) requires CEOs to evaluate and provide a management report on the effectiveness of their firms’ ICFR annually. SOX 
Section 404(b) requires the firm’s external auditor to issue an annual report with an opinion on the effectiveness of the client’s ICFR based on an 
independent evaluation. SOX Section 404 has been effective for accelerated filers from the fiscal year beginning on or after November 15, 2004. 
Although non-accelerated filers have been required to comply with Section 404(a) from the fiscal year beginning on or after December 15, 2007, 
T 
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ICFR are more likely to suffer stock price crashes after controlling for the factors affecting them. Further analysis 
reveals that the more material weaknesses firms have, the more likely stock price crashes become. 
 
Our study contributes to the research in several ways. First, the literature on internal control effectiveness has 
extensively investigated the economic consequence of internal control weakness. Our study provides additional 
evidence that ineffective internal control is positively associated with stock price crashes. Second, studies (e.g., 
Hutton et al. 2009) have revealed that stock price crash risk is positively (negatively) associated with opaque 
(transparent) financial information. Our finding of the positive association between internal control weakness and 
stock price crash risk confirms that effective ICFR plays a critical role in maintaining and/or enhancing the 
reliability of financial reporting and thus enhancing the transparency of financial information. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a literature review and hypothesis 
development. Section III describes the research design, including the sample selection and measurement of crash 
risk and internal control weakness. Section IV presents our empirical results, and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Since the adoption of SOX Section 404, the economic consequences of disclosed internal control 
weaknesses have been extensively investigated. The literature documents a negative association between ineffective 
internal control and earnings quality. For instance, Doyle et al. (2007), Ogneva et al. (2007), and Chan et al. (2009) 
report that firms with material ICFR weaknesses have higher discretionary accruals. Moreover, markets negatively 
value the disclosure of internal control weaknesses under SOX Section 302 or 404 (e.g., Beneish et al., 2008; 
Hammersley et al., 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) provide evidence that firms 
with internal control weaknesses are more likely to have higher costs of equity. 
 
Hutton et al. (2009) show that opaque financial reporting is positively correlated with stock price crash risk. 
Kim et al. (2014) analyze the association between financial reporting transparency and stock price crashes in the 
context of firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. They find that more active CSR leads to enhanced 
financial reporting transparency, reducing the potential stock price crash risk. Kim et al. (2011) find that firms with 
higher sheltering probabilities, lower long-run cash effective tax rates, and larger book–tax differences are more 
likely to experience firm-specific stock price crashes. Consistent with the expectation that conservatism lowers stock 
price crash risk because conservative accounting releases bad news in a more timely way, Kim et al. (2015) find that 
conditional conservatism is significantly and negatively associated with stock price crash risk. Using a Chinese 
database, Xu et al. (2013) find that higher analyst coverage leads to stock price crash risk, a link that intensifies 
when analysts provide a more optimistic forecast to investors. Kim et al. (2014) provide evidence that stock price 
crashes are positively associated with managerial overconfidence.  
 
Overall, then, the literature suggests that opaque financial reporting and/or information asymmetry is one of 
the most important factors affecting the occurrence of stock price crashes. Considering the positive association 
between effective ICFR and the reliability/transparency of financial reporting, therefore, we propose that internal 
control weakness can lead to stock price crash risk: Therefore, I hypothesize (at the alternative form): 
 
H: Firms with ineffective internal control are more likely to have stock price crashes.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and the 2010 Consumer Protection Act permanently exempted non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b) 
internal control audits (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). 
3 AS No. 5 defines “material weakness” as a “deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, such that 
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected on a timely basis.” 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Empirical model 
 
We test our hypothesis through the following logistic regression: 
 
CRASH i,t+1 = α0 + α1 MWi,t + α2 SIZEi,t + α3 MBi,t + α4 LEVi,t + α5 ROEi,t+ α6 DAi,t+ ε i,τ (1) 
 
Following Hutton et al. (2009), we use the measure of stock price crash likelihood for each firm in each year 
(CRASH) in Eq. (1) as an indicator variable, equal to 1 if a firm experiences one or more crash weeks during a fiscal 
year period and 0 otherwise. 
 
The measurement procedure for firm-specific crash risk is as follows. First, we estimate firm-specific weekly 
returns for each firm and year. The returns (W) are defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return 
from the following expanded market model regression, following the literature (Jin and Myers, 2006):  
 
r j,τ = αj + β1j r m,τ-2 + β2j r m,τ-1 + β3j r m,τ + β4j r m,τ+1 + β5j r m,τ+2 + ε j,τ, (2) 
 
w j,τ,=ln(1+ ε j,τ)  (3) 
 
where rj,τ is the return on stock j in week τ and rm,τ is the return in the CRSP value-weighted market index in week τ. 
We include the lead and lag terms for the market index return to allow for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). 
The firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week τ, w j,τ, is calculated by Eq. (2). When estimating the firm-specific 
weekly return (W), we use residual return rather than raw return since the former can capture the firm-specific 
idiosyncratic factors.  
 
We define “crash weeks” as those in which a firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year. This number (3.2) is chosen to 
generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution. 
 
The test variable, MW(MW_Dummy), is measured in two ways. First, MW is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
firm discloses internal control weakness under SOX Section 404(b) and 0 otherwise. Second, MW(MW_Number) is 
measured as the number of internal control weaknesses disclosed. Following the literature (e.g., Hutton et al. 2009), 
we include control variables such as SIZE, MB, LEV, ROE, and DA. Firm size (SIZE) is a natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. Market-to-book ratio (MB) is the market value of equity 
scaled by the equity of book value at the beginning of the fiscal year. Leverage (LEV) is the book value of total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. Return on equity (ROE) is the income before 
extraordinary items divided by the book value of equity. We also include discretionary accruals (DA) to control for 
financial reporting transparency.  
 
3.2. Sample selection 
  
The initial sample concerning the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting under SOX 
Section 404(b) comprises 18,264 firm-year observations covering 2004 to 2012, obtained from the Audit Analytics 
database. Stock return data for calculating stock price crash risk and financial statement data are obtained from the 
CRSP and Compustat fundamentals annual databases, respectively. The sample for internal control effectiveness is 
merged with the stock price crash variable and other control variables. Excluding missing variables and financial 
institutions (SIC code 6000-6999) produces 10,881 sample firms.  
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VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis and Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Min Q1 Q3 Max 
CRASH 0.164 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MW_Dummy 0.071 0.000 0.256 0.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
MW_Number 0.165 0.000 0.903 0.000  0.000  0.000 20.000 
SIZE 7.036 6.885 1.758 0.561 5.710 8.141 13.131 
MB 2.849 2.135 3.606 -15.284 1.409 3.340 32.909 
LEV 0.510 0.496 0.289 0.014 0.332 0.647 6.883 
ROE 0.051 0.105 0.512 -6.044 0.025 0.179 4.177 
DA 0.001 0.005 0.118 –2.261 –0.033 0.042 2.128 
Variable definitions: MW_Dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm discloses internal control weaknesses under SOX Section 404(b) and 0 
otherwise. MW_Number is measured as the number of disclosed internal control weaknesses. Firm size (SIZE) is a natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. Market-to-book ratio (MB) is the market value of equity scaled by the equity of book 
value at the beginning of the fiscal year. Leverage (LEV) is the book value of total liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. Return on equity (ROE) is the income before extraordinary items divided by the book value of equity. Discretionary accruals (DA) are 
measured following Kothari et al. (2005). 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample (n=10,881). The results show that 16.4% 
(n=1,783) of the 10,881 sample firms suffer a stock price crash the following year. 7.1% (n=773) of 10,881 sample 
firms disclose material weakness(es) in internal control over financial reporting. Each of SIZE, MB, and LEV has a 
close mean and median. The mean values of ROE and DA are greater than the median values, indicating that ROE 
and DA are negatively skewed.  
 
Table 2. Univariate Analysis 
 CRASH=1 CRASH=0 Difference in Mean 
 Mean Mean t-statistics 
MW_Dummy 0.122 0.061 7.58*** 
MW_Number 0.288 0.141 5.33*** 
SIZE 6.032 7.230 -32.22*** 
MB 2.931 2.833 0.85 
LEV 0.527 0.507 2.04** 
ROE -0.118 0.084 -10.51*** 
DA -0.006 0.003 -2.13** 
n 1,783 9,098  
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed test). See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
Table 2 presents the mean difference test results between stock price crash (CRASH=1) and non-stock crash 
firms (CRASH=0). Consistent with our expectation, 12.2% (n=218) of stock crash firms (n=1,783) have material 
ICFR weaknesses the year before the crash, compared to 6.1% (n=555) of non-stock crash firms (n=9,098). The 
mean difference is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that weakness in internal control over financial reporting is 
more likely to cause stock price crashes. Moreover, the mean of MW_Number of stock price crash firms is 
significantly higher than that of non-stock crash firms. In addition, firms with stock price crashes are smaller, have 
higher leverage, are less profitable, and have more income-reducing discretionary accruals. Those mean differences 
are significant at the 1 or 5% level. 
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Table 3. Correlation Analysis 
Variable CRASH MW_Dummy MW_Number SIZE MB LEV ROE DA 
CRASH  0.089*** 0.061*** -0.253*** 0.010 0.026*** -0.146*** -0.027*** MW_Dummy 0.089***  0.662*** -0.133*** 0.001 0.038*** -0.037*** -0.001 
MW_Number 0.090*** 0.999***  -0.088*** 0.001 0.069*** -0.022** -0.004 SIZE -0.259*** -0.141*** -0.141***   0.159** 0.100*** 0.168*** -0.012 
MB -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.327***  -0.068*** 0.089*** -0.003 LEV -0.016* 0.019** 0.021** 0.224*** -0.039***  0.071*** 0.018* ROE -0.183*** -0.100*** -0.102*** 0.373*** 0.433*** 0.183***  0.156*** DA -0.030*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.024** 0.062*** -0.003 0.167***  The numbers above (below) the diagonal are the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation between all the variables used in the empirical model. As expected, CRASH, 
MW_Dummy, and MW_Number are positively and significantly correlated, offering preliminary evidence that firms 
with material weaknesses in their internal control over financial reporting are more likely to have a stock price crash 
the following year. CRASH is negatively correlated with SIZE. All correlations are below 0.5, except for that 
between MW_Dummy and MW_Number. 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 4 provides the regression results of the association between material weakness in internal control 
over financial reporting and stock price crashes. Model (1) in Table 4 shows the result, using the dummy variable 
MW_Dummy as a test variable. The coefficient (0.373) of MW_Dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that firms with weak ICFR are more likely to have a stock price crash the following year. This result 
persists when MW_Number is used as an alternative test variable in Model (2). Here, the coefficient (0.067) of 
MW_Number is significant at the 1% level. Our hypothesis is thus strongly supported by the empirical results.  
 
Table 4. Results Of Logistic Regressions 
 DV=CRASH 
(1) 
DV=CRASH 
(2) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Intercept -0.568 -0.02 -0.510 -0.02 
MW_Dummy 0.373*** 3.94   
MW_Number   0.067*** 2.63 
SIZE -0.489*** -23.75 -0.494*** -24.13 
MB 0.037*** 5.10 0.037*** 5.06 
LEV 0.718*** 7.26 0.719*** 7.26 
ROE -0.423*** -8.85 -0.424*** -8.89 
DA -0.309 1.53 -0.307 -1.53 
YEAR Included Included 
IND Included Included 
Max-rescaled R2 20.51% 20.39% 
n 10,881 10,881 
Note:***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
Overall, consistent with our expectation, we find that ineffective ICFR is positively associated with stock 
price crash risk, suggesting that internal control deficiency is an indicator of stock price crashes.  
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As is well known, opaque financial reporting is more likely to cause information asymmetry, leading to stock 
price crashes. Establishing and maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting is essential for 
reliability and transparency. 
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This paper examines the association between weak internal control and the occurrence of stock price crashes, 
finding that material ICFR weakness increases information asymmetry by producing unreliable and/or opaque 
financial reporting, resulting in stock price crashes. Our study thus provides evidence that weak ICFR is an indicator 
of stock price crashes.  
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